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Analyticity in Externalist Languages
Gillian Russell

1 Introduction

I am going to argue for a different way of thinking about the analytic/synthetic distinction (ASD). The view that I will present is complicated in some respects and it makes reference to unfamiliar entities, and so my strategy in arguing for it will be that of Bertrand Russell in ‘On Denoting’: I will present a number of puzzles for the traditional account of the ASD, and argue that my account can solve them all.

I will not have much to say here about Quine’s objections to analyticity, though I have had much to say about them elsewhere. (Russell 2008) Rather, I will be presenting a series of new puzzles which rely on phenomena that have risen to prominence in the decades since the Quine-Carnap debate – phenomena such as direct reference, semantic externalism and indexicality. There is some awareness in the literature that these phenomena cause problems for the already beleaguered distinction (Putnam 1962; Kripke 1985/80a; Salmon 1993; Boghossian 1996; Williamson 2007), but if my central claim here is correct, then the ASD – properly understood – is compatible with all the new developments.

2 Analytic sentences

The ASD is sometimes introduced with the following story: there are two factors that go into making a sentence true, the way the world is, and what the sentence means. The sentence ‘grass is green’ for example, is true in part because it means what it does, and in part because grass has the colour it has. Sentences like this are synthetic. Analytic sentences, on the other hand, are those for which the meaning alone – independently of the input of the world – is sufficient to make them true. Commonly presented examples include the truths of arithmetic and logic, as well as so-called conceptual truths, such as ‘all bachelors are unmarried’ and ‘triangles have three sides’.

For many, the basic idea of an analytic sentence – though not the details or defence of any particular philosophical account – is deeply intuitive. When introduced to it, students often have the feeling of being reminded of something which at some level they already knew. The Socratic explanation for this might be that they were familiar with the ASD when they lived among the forms, but another explanation – more plausible to my way of thinking – is that the existence of analytic sentences is a natural consequence of an intuitive folk theory of meaning.

The folk theory goes like this: linguistic expressions have meanings, and meanings play three roles. (1) they are what speakers have to know about an expression in order to count as understanding it. For example, my brother counts as understanding ‘alacrity’ if he knows what it means. (2) an expression’s meaning determines – in conjunction with the way the world is – the extension of that expression, such as its referent in the case of a singular term, or the set of objects which satisfies it in the case of a monadic predicate. (3) the meaning of an expression is what the expression contributes to what is said by a sentence containing it. The English sentence ‘muscle fibres are elastic’ says that (more fancily put: ‘expresses the proposition that’) muscle fibres are elastic, but if the word ‘elastic’ had had the meaning that the word ‘rigid’ has, the sentence would have said something different, namely, that muscle fibres are rigid. Thus the meaning of the sentence-part contributes to the meaning of the sentence.

I call this sketch a folk theory, but in calling it such I mean neither to suggest that the folk would explain it in such technical language, nor that the conception of meaning it encapsulates is limited to the folk. Many of us begin our theorizing about language with common sense, and the gist of the picture is apparent in the work of philosophers as diverse as Immanuel Kant, Gottlob Frege, Rudolf Carnap, Jerrold Katz, David Lewis, and Frank Jackson.

With this picture in the background, the traditional account of analyticity follows easily. Suppose we decide to add a new expression to our language, say ‘mimsy’. In order to introduce a new expression – as opposed to merely drawing attention to a string of letters or sounds – one has to give it a meaning. One way to do this is by providing a synonym, i.e., an expression which already has the meaning which we wish to give to ‘mimsy’. Let’s use ‘cold and slimy’ and introduce ‘mimsy’ by means of the following definition: something is mimsy if and only if it is cold and slimy. Assuming for the moment that everything has gone smoothly, ‘mimsy’ now means what ‘cold and slimy’ means. Given the folk theory, this has three important consequences.

First, according to (2), meaning, together with the way the world is, determines extension. So, given that ‘mimsy’ and ‘cold and slimy’ mean the same thing, it must be the case that they have the same extension. This has the consequence that ‘every mimsy thing is cold and slimy’ is a true sentence.
Propositions such as "All men are mortal" are universally true and independent of any specific context. The truth of such propositions is not dependent on the particular circumstances of any particular case. They are true in all possible worlds and at all times. The universality and necessity of such propositions make them a cornerstone of logic and metaphysics. They are often used to establish the basis for more complex arguments and reasoning. The study of logical and existential propositions is closely related to the field of modal logic, which deals with the concepts of necessity, possibility, and contingency. The study of such propositions is essential for understanding the nature of reality and the limits of human knowledge.
differ from (1) in two crucial ways. First, it is rather more plausible that (2) is analytic than it was that (1) was, and second, (2) is not an identity sentence; it does not contain names, and the relation it expresses is non-symmetric.

Yet (2) raises problems of its own. Hilary Putnam has argued that (2) can be false, which fits ill with the traditional picture of analyticity. (Putnam 1962) His argument is developed over three cases, of which the last is the most important. In it we are asked to imagine that there have never been any animals resembling cats on earth, or indeed anywhere else, but that the creatures we call 'cats' are, and indeed always have been, robots (perhaps placed on Earth to spy by the Martians.) Thus all human acquaintance with cat-like objects has really been with things that are not animals. Putnam points out that were we to discover this fact we would say, not that there were no cats, but that cats had turned out to be very different than we thought. Unlike dogs, horses, and koalas, cats turned out not to be animals. And hence the sentence 'all cats are animals' would be false under those circumstances.

This, of course, fits ill with the intuition that the sentence is analytic for, according to the traditional picture, analyticity is sufficient to guarantee necessary truth. Moreover it is hard to maintain that a claim is a priori when its truth depends on an a posteriori claim such as that, at some time in the past, there were cats that were animals, and not robot spies from Mars.

3.3 Puzzle 3: Minimalism about semantic competence

One of the main themes of post-Quinean twentieth century philosophy of language has been the idea that linguistic competence might not require knowledge of a criterion for uniquely distinguishing things that fall into the extension of an expression. For example, Putnam suggested that ordinary competent speakers of English who use the words 'elm' and 'beech' need not be able to distinguish elms from beeches. (Putnam 1985/73) The ideas of reference via causal-historical chains, division of linguistic labour, and semantic deference provide models of language on which users of an expression need not have knowledge of anything (far less a meaning) that would uniquely determine the extension of the expression, and so they tend to allow for very minimal requirements on semantic competence (Kripke 1980b; Soames 2001; Putnam 1985/73; Burge 1986 and 1991/79).

This lowering of the standards for semantic competence threatens to erode the epistemic import of analyticity. If, as the picture of analyticity suggested by the folk picture suggests, all analytic truths can be known on the basis of what you have to know to be semantically competent, then, more or less, the less you have to know to be semantically competent, the fewer truths will be analytic.

Timothy Williamson argues for an even more acute version of such minimalism about semantic competence, according to which there is no particular thing that one is required to know for semantic competence.

A complex web of interactions and dependencies can hold a linguistic or conceptual practice together even in the absence of a common creed that all participants at all times are required to endorse...although disagreement is naturally easier to negotiate and usually more fruitful against a background of extensive agreement, it does not follow that any particular agreement is needed for disagreement to be expressed in given words. (Williamson 2007, p. 125)

He then argues that even a sentence such as (3):

(3) All vixens are female foxes.

is not analytic, on the grounds that someone could be competent with all the expressions in the sentence without considering it to be true. He asks us to consider, for example, Peter, who holds two rather unusual, but well-defended, views: one about the semantics of the universal quantifier, according to which (3) entails 'there is at least one vixen', and a further odd conspiracy theory on which there are no vixens. Peter thus rejects (3) and Williamson concludes that since a competent speaker could reject it, the sentence is not analytic. The worry is, of course, that radical minimalism about semantic competence allows this strategy to be extended to every putatively analytic sentence.

Hence puzzle 3 is this: if we accept some form of minimalism about semantic competence, how can we avoid the conclusion that there are very few, or even no, analytic sentences?

3.4 Puzzle 4: Indexicality

The final puzzle arises when one considers indexicals, such as 'I' and 'now'. A sentence containing an indexical will say different things in different contexts, because, given different contexts, the indexical contributes something different to the proposition. For example, when GR utters 'I am going swimming' she expresses the proposition that GR is going swimming, and when RM utters the same sentence, he expresses the distinct proposition that RM is going swimming. What makes this possible is that the contribution made by 'I' to the proposition expressed by the sentence containing it changes as the context changes. In the case of pure indexicals like 'I', 'here' and 'now' the contribution made by the expression is systematically determined by a rule which determines a function from contexts to propositional contribution. In these cases we can, for the sake of argument, adopt Kaplan's suggestion that the rule for 'I' is that it always contributes the agent of the context, the rule for 'here' is that it always contributes the place of the context and the rule for 'now' is that it always contributes the time of the context.

'I am here now' is another sentence that does not fit happily into the traditional analytic or synthetic categories. It seems to be true in virtue
The distinction of paraphrastic and non-paraphrastic sentences.

and in part because of the way the word is used. The word in the English language has the meaning of the word in the context of the meaning of the word in the context of the meaning of the word, and so on. The meaning is not fixed, but rather it is determined by the context in which it is used. The meaning of a word is not fixed, but rather it is determined by the context in which it is used. The meaning of a word is not fixed, but rather it is determined by the context in which it is used.
The new definition of analyticity resolves the puzzle. Reappraisal can be defined in a natural way, however, to give us an account of the puzzling facts.

4.3. Context of Introduction

Definition 1 (analyticity: model of definition) A sentence is analytic if and only if

the proposition expressed by (the concept of) is true in all worlds in which it is true in virtue of the meanings of the words in the sentence, and these meanings are determined by context.

The main problem with reappraisal of a concept of a proposition is that in order for the sentence to be true, the words in the sentence must be determined by context. This is because the meaning of a word can change depending on the context in which it is used. For example, the word "knife" can mean a sharp implement used for cutting, or it can mean a type of fish. The context in which the word is used determines its meaning.

Therefore, in order for a sentence to be analytic, the meanings of the words in the sentence must be determined by context. This is because the meaning of a word can change depending on the context in which it is used. For example, the word "knife" can mean a sharp implement used for cutting, or it can mean a type of fish. The context in which the word is used determines its meaning.

This is why the concept of a proposition is so important in the study of analyticity. The concept of a proposition allows us to determine the meaning of a sentence, and therefore whether it is analytic or not.
Sometimes confusion is caused with the property of expressing a necessary truth in modal logic. If we denote the modal operator as □, then □A means that A is necessarily true. However, □A does not necessarily mean that A is true in all possible worlds. It only means that A is true in some possible worlds.

In modal logic, the operator □ is known as the 'necessity operator'. The expression □A means that A is true in all possible worlds. On the other hand, □A means that A is true in at least one possible world. Therefore, □A does not necessarily mean that A is true in all possible worlds. It only means that A is true in some possible worlds.

An example of a logical fallacy is the 'appeal to authority'. If someone says, 'John is a professor, and he says that A is true, so A must be true', they are committing the fallacy of appeal to authority.

Another example is the 'equivocation'. If someone says, 'Lies are lies, and John is not a lie, therefore John is not a lie', they are committing the fallacy of equivocation. In this case, 'lies' has two different meanings: one referring to statements that are false, and the other referring to the act of telling a lie.

In natural language, the expression 'I believe' is often used to denote a personal assertion of belief. However, in logic, 'I believe' cannot be used as a proposition because it does not express a fact or a truth.

The fallacy of the 'straw man' is another common logical fallacy. If someone says, 'You believe in A, but I believe in B, so your argument is flawed', they are creating a false dichotomy by representing the other person's view in a way that is easily dismissed.

In conclusion, it is important to understand the distinctions between logical fallacies and logical arguments. By doing so, we can avoid making mistakes in our reasoning and communicate more effectively.
usually attributed to analytic sentences. I think there are, and to see this it will help to consider the phenomenon of parasitic reference determination where the reference determiners are, for the most part, unknown to speakers. Consider a situation (perhaps not so different from the actual one) in which the name ‘Cassius’ was introduced to the language when Mr Clay, indicating his newborn son, said ‘You’re right; it’s a good name. Let’s call him “Cassius”’. The name ‘Muhammed Ali’, on the other hand, is introduced in a different way that causes its reference determiner to be parasitic on the reference determiner for ‘Cassius’. At a certain point in his boxing career and journey towards the Muslim faith, Cassius’ spiritual advisor says ‘From now on, Cassius will be known as “Muhammed Ali”’. Cassius and the rest of the community adopt this name.

As a result of this second stipulation, ‘Muhammed Ali’ will now refer to whoever ‘Cassius’ referred to in the advisor’s utterance. But, of course, the reference determiner for ‘Cassius’ is not sensitive to the context in which the advisor did his uttering, but only to the context in which ‘Cassius’ was introduced. As a result, the reference determiner for ‘Muhammed Ali’ will be sensitive to the context in which ‘Cassius’ was introduced. As evidence for this, consider what we would say if Mrs Clay’s baby had been replaced with an alien baby spy whilst still in the womb, whilst her biological baby went off to live a new life on Mars. Alien Spy Baby is eventually born, baptized ‘Cassius’ by Mr Clay, and grows up to become a great boxer. Later on his advisor says ‘From now on, Cassius will be known as “Muhammed Ali”’. In these circumstances we would say that Cassius is an Alien Spy, but also, crucially, that Muhammed Ali is an Alien Spy, which demonstrates that the referent of the second name is sensitive to changes in the context of introduction for the first.

Now consider what the modal definition of analyticity says about the sentence ‘Cassius is Muhammed Ali’ compared to what it says about ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’. ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ was not true in virtue of meaning because there are contexts of introduction with respect to which ‘the evening star’ picks out Mars and the morning star picks out Venus. But the parallel situation cannot arise with ‘Cassius is Muhammed Ali’ so that sentence will be true in virtue of meaning, though clearly it will not be a priori to many speakers that Cassius is Muhammed Ali.

‘I am here now’ is also true in virtue of meaning, and epistemically it is an interesting case. Indexicals are rather unusual expressions in that speakers normally know how to work out what the referent is, given the context – they have to implicitly know what the reference determiner is. But this knowledge means that they know the premises of the argument to the conclusion that the sentence ‘I am here now’ is true. Hence semantic competence does give one access to the fact that this sentence is true.

But in a different respect both ‘Cassius is Muhammed Ali’ and ‘I am here now’ are on an epistemic par: it is the case that if one knows the reference determiners for all the expressions in the sentence, one can work out that the sentence is true. It is this property that is the epistemic consequence of analyticity, and it takes the natural but false assumption that competent speakers know the reference determiners for expressions to derive the false claim that competent speakers can work out that analytic sentences are true.

For these reasons I hold, pace Williamson, that minimalism about semantic competence does not lead to minimalism about analyticity itself, but rather to minimalism about the access that semantic competence gives to analytic truths.

6 Beyond the modal definition

The previous definition of analyticity was given more or less in terms of possible worlds along with some useful concepts from set theory. Despite the real progress represented by possible worlds analyses of semantic concepts, they have had a tendency to fall short. There is no satisfactory definition of direct reference, or content in terms of possible worlds. Newtonian mechanics is powerful and useful, but tends to get things wrong at really high relative velocities. The possible worlds approach to semantics is similarly powerful and useful, but it tends to get things wrong in the presence of non-linguistic necessity (Thomason 1974; Kaplan 1989a; Soames 1987; 1998, 1999, 2001, 2004; King Summer 2005).

My own modal definition of analyticity is no exception, and, where non-linguistic necessity enters the picture, we can have sentences which have the same distinctive modal profile as an analytic sentence, even though they didn’t get that profile because of something special about their meaning, but rather because of the substantive metaphysical facts. For theists, one example might be ‘there is a god’, which (at least if we insist on a certain non-indexical interpretation of the quantifier) contains no names or indexicals, and so if it expresses a necessary truth, no variation in the contexts of introduction or utterances will make it false. Or suppose, for a crazy but particularly clear example, that there are only 15 possible worlds, and in every possible world, the evening star is the morning star. Then ‘the evening star is the morning star’ would express a necessary truth, and do so without being analytic. Even if these are not very convincing examples, I hope that the problem they illustrate is clear: our modal definition is hostage to the facts about metaphysical necessity. But whether or not a sentence is analytic should depend on facts about its reference determiners alone, and not on facts about the modal world.

Unlike physicists working with Newtonian mechanics, we do not yet have a well-developed alternative to the possible worlds approach to semantics. The best alternative is mostly restricted to the concepts of content and direct reference, and it is the Russelian/Kaplanian ‘metaphysical picture’ according to which propositions are set-theoretic sequences which take ordinary
objects and perhaps properties as elements. I propose to extend this metaphysical picture so that it can be used to provide a stricter definition of analyticity. I will only have space to sketch the basic idea here.

Sentences such as ‘Cassius is Cassius’ and ‘bachelors are bachelors’ seem to be analytic (prescinding from worries about reference failure in the first sentence for now) because the reference determiner for the first occurrence of ‘Cassius’ is the same as the reference determiner for the second occurrence of ‘Cassius’ and similarly for ‘bachelors’. The same will hold if the reference determiners for ‘bachelors’ and ‘unmarried men’ are known to be the same, even though the words are different: ‘bachelors are unmarried men’ will be analytic. It seems that identity of reference determiner, used appropriately in a sentence, can induce analyticity.

But so can something else. ‘Mohammed Ali is Cassius’ and ‘bachelors are unmarried’ are analytic, but in these sentences it is not that the reference determiner of one expression is identical with that of another, but that the reference determiner of one is parasitic on, or part of, or contained in the other. Having noticed this, we see that identity is simply the limit case of containment – it is containment that is the more general notion.

There is a long history of using something like containment to define analyticity. Before we had possible world semantics, this was the concept for which we instinctively reached. For example, Locke writes that a claim is ‘trifling’ when, ‘a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole’ (Locke 1993/1690) and Kant that, ‘Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it. In the one case I entitle the judgments analytic, in the other synthetic.’ (Kant, First Critique, A7/B11).

I want to suggest that the metaphysical picture for analyticity should include reference determiners, and containment relations between reference determiners. It will not suffice, however, to replace the words ‘belongs to’ in Kant’s definition with ‘contains’ and ‘predicate B’ with ‘reference determiner of B’, because 250 odd years have shown up some other technical problems with Kant’s approach (Frege 1980/1884; Quine 1951 and 1961; Katz 1967 and 1974).

However we can generalize Kant’s notions of subject and predicate to the notions of logical subject expression (LSE) and logical predicate expression (LPE) and to invoke a third sentence-part, the modifier (M) of the sentence. Roughly the (LSE) is the expression, or sequence of expressions that tell us what the sentence is making a claim about. The (LPE) is the expression in the sentence that tells us what the sentence is saying about the referent of the (LSE). In the simplest case, a sentence will be true just in case the objects which satisfy the (LSE) meet the condition specified by the (LPE), e.g., ‘snow is white’ will be true just in case the objects which satisfy the reference determiner for ‘snow’ meet the condition specified by ‘is white’. It seems clear that something special will happen if meeting the condition specified by the (LPE) is a prerequisite for satisfying the (LSE): so long as something satisfies the (LSE) the sentence cannot help but be true. Hence we might be tempted to say that a sentence is analytic just in case the reference determiner for the (LPE) is contained in that of the (LSE).

But this would not be quite right. Consider what should be said about putatively analytic sentences like ‘no bachelor is married’, ‘it is not the case that any bachelor is married’, ‘Mary walks with those with whom she herself strolls’ and ‘poor people have less money than rich people’, all of which are putatively analytic, but do not meet the suggested definition. Moreover, more has to be said about the effects of failure to refer. Finally, the proximity of analyticity to logical truth suggests that analyticity might be generalizable to arguments, as in:

Sam is a bachelor.

Therefore, Sam is unmarried.

If so, analytic truth might turn out to be a special case of analytic consequence and analytic truths might then be divisible into two kinds, i) core analytic truths in which a particular containment relation holds between the subject and the predicate, and ii) analytic consequences of core analytic truths.

More work needs to be done on all these topics, but I will finish by simply presenting and illustrating my second definition:

**Definition 2 (Analyticity (metaphysical picture))** A sentence that consists of modifier (M), logical subject expression (LSE) and logical predicate expression (LPE), is analytic if (i) the sentence can be true even if the reference determiner for the (LSE) is not met by anything, and (ii) either (M) is positive and the reference determiner for (LSE) contains the reference determiner for (LPE) or M is negative and the reference determiner for (LSE) excludes the reference determiner for (LPE).

At an intuitive level, the modifier (M) is a part of the sentence that can modify the relation required between the object(s) picked out by the (LSE) and the condition specified by the (LPE) in order for the sentence to be true. For example, while ‘bachelors are unmarried’ will be true just in case the objects picked out by the (LPE) (bachelors) meet the condition specified by the (LSE) (being unmarried), ‘no bachelors are married’ will be true just in case the objects picked out by ‘bachelors’ fail to meet the condition specified by ‘married’. This modification can get pretty complicated, for consider ‘some bachelors are unmarried’, ‘four bachelors are unmarried’ etc. However, modifiers can be split into three kinds, and only two are important when it comes to analyticity. Positive modifiers require that the condition specified by the (LPE) be met by every object which meets the (LSE) in order for the
sentence to be true. Examples include ‘all’ and ‘every’. Negative modifiers require that no object which meets the (LSE) satisfy the condition specified by the (LPE). The paradigm case is ‘no’ in ‘no bachelors are married’. Every other kind of modifier is neutral. Clause (i) in the definition is simply intended to rule out cases where the sentence will be false if the (LSE) is not met by anything.8 Clause (ii) in the definition specifies two ways in which a sentence can be analytic. Either the modifier is positive and the reference determiner for the LSE contains that of the LPE. The sentence ‘all bachelors are unmarried’ is analytic in this way. Alternatively the modifier is negative and the reference determiner for the LSE excludes that of the LPE. The sentence ‘no bachelor is married’ is analytic in this way.

7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented four puzzles for analyticity. They are not the usual objections presented by Quine and his followers, but rather puzzles that have arisen out of post-Quinean philosophy of language. Where there is an awareness of these problems for the traditional conception of analyticity, it is usually assumed that they provide one more reason to give up on the ASD. I have argued that this is not the case, and that the puzzles arise because of phenomena which undermine the folk theory of meaning that supported the traditional account of analyticity. I have argued that revamping that folk account of meaning into one which is compatible with the new phenomena will give us a new account of truth in virtue of meaning, in effect, a new account of the ASD. In part my account has been presented in terms of the usual functions between contexts and possible worlds, and I have shown how this account can solve all four puzzles. But the definition given in these terms is susceptible to a problem that besets all semantic definitions given in modal terms – the definition tends to go awry in the presence of substantive necessity. My response to this problem has been to sketch the beginnings of a metaphysical picture – on the model of Kaplan’s metaphysical picture for direct reference – and use it to define analyticity. This last section of the chapter has been a bit wild and sketchy but, I hope, not without interest anyway.

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Notes

1. One might wonder whether accommodating these phenomena requires a complete rejection of the folk picture; at times Putnam seems to suggest that it is not that the folk view is wrong, so much as that it only applies to a restricted type of expression (e.g., to expressions like ‘chair’ and ‘bachelor’ and not to ‘water’). If so, then we can imagine a theory according to which there were several ways in which expressions could work, and one picture of the way meaning worked was right for certain expressions, and another for others. This is a view that reminds me strongly of the famous passage from the Investigations in which Wittgenstein writes:

Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. – The function of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. (Wittgenstein 1953, section 11)

Wittgenstein’s view is a much more radical one than the one I am entertaining here. Yet the metaphor is useful one: even within the part of language that is used for the tasks of asserting, describing and naming we can think of different expressions as having different kinds of uses: names can be the hammers, the definite descriptions the paints etc. small wonder then that they have different semantic, metaphysical and epistemic properties when they are used for such different things. If we were to adopt this picture, we might stage a rescue of the ASD by claiming that it only applies to certain parts of language – the parts where the traditional story about meaning is correct – and it has no place where there are indexicals, names, natural kind predicates, etc. or where phenomena like semantic defeence and division of linguistic labour have taken a hold.

That conservative approach would be a mistake, however. One reason is that there are analytic-sentences which contain, and even rely upon, the unfolkly phenomena, such as ‘all red water is water’ and ‘I am here now’. A second is that there is reason to doubt that there are any expressions that function as the naive folk view holds that all expressions function, especially as liberalism about semantic competence has a tendency to leak all over the language. Williamson provides numerous examples to support the thesis that liberalism about semantic competence is not limited in its scope to a particular subset of words. (Williamson 2008, chapter 4)

2. One way to think about the kind of claim I am making here is this: there are real, intuitive phenomena – of which analyticity is one – out there that we, as philosophers, are aware of and attempt to characterize. This is difficult and even the best of philosophers will often misdescribe the phenomenon in which they are interested, and attribute properties to it that are really properties of something else, or properties of nothing. Twentieth-century philosophy of language provided us with a surprising thought, namely that the reference determiner of an expression had often been misdescribed as the meaning of an expression, whereas in fact it is often – say in the case of names and natural kind predicates – something that is distinct from the expression’s meaning, because it is not only known to speakers nor a part of what is said. I merely extend this view: truth in virtue of reference determiner has often been misdescribed as truth in virtue of meaning. Still, it is truth in virtue of reference determiner that is the phenomenon that is really of interest.

3. Occasionally I have heard the suggestion that since there are four different kinds of meaning (when one includes referent/extension) on my view, there might be four
different kinds of truth in virtue of meaning. Perhaps, but only truth in virtue of reference determiner is the important one for analyticity. One argument against taking truth in virtue of meaning to be truth in virtue of character is Williamson's: since characters have turned out to be minimal or non-existent, very little is true in virtue of character, and so that approach does nothing to account for the familiar notion of analyticity—all we're left with is an error theory. An argument against taking truth in virtue of meaning to be truth in virtue of extension is that varying the extension of an analytic sentence appears to have no effect on its analyticity: 'all bachelors are unmarried' comes out analytic independently of which people are bachelors: a few more people marrying or having sex-changes will not affect the analyticity of the sentence. An argument against taking truth in virtue of meaning to be truth in virtue of content is that in cases of analytic sentences where the content and reference determiner of their component expressions come apart, such as with analytic sentences containing indexicals, varying the content seems to have no effect on the analyticity of the sentence: 'I am here now' is analytic whether it expresses the content that GR is at work, or whether it says RM is at home.

4. Strictly speaking, the Kaplan of Demonstratives sometimes calls the phenomenon 'the contingent analytic' and sometimes 'the contingent a priori'. I hold that the former was a mere apt description.

5. Formally, the world of evaluation makes an appearance as a part of the context of utterance, construed as a quadruple (a, p, t, w) in which the fourth element is a possible world. A sentence is true in a context if the proposition it expresses in that context is true at the world of that context. The only admissible contexts are those in which the agent (a) is located at the place (p) and time (t) of the context in the world (w) and hence 'I am here now' comes out true at all contexts.

6. A sentence is true relative to a context of introduction and context of utterance pair just in case it is true relative to the triple of that context of introduction, that context of utterance, and the circumstance of evaluation that is given by the time and world of the context of utterance. This is how we get the two-place function from the three-place one.

7. This of course, cannot be right, if only because cats who have lost a leg are still cats.

8. This clause deals brutally with reference-failure cases, such as 'Muhammad Ali is Cassius Clay'. They do not count as analytic, because the sentence would not be true if say Mrs Clay had had a phantom pregnancy and was referring to her own hallucination when she introduced the name 'Cassius'. Overall, this seems too brutal to me, and we can soften the blow by introducing a class of pseudo-analytic sentences, which meet only clause ii) of the definition of analyticity, i.e., Definition 3 (Pseudo-Analytic) A sentence that consists of modifier (M), logical subject expression (LSE) and logical predicate expression (LPE), is pseudo-analytic if (M) is positive and the reference determiner of the (LSE) contains the reference determiner of the (LPE) or (M) is negative and the reference determiner of the (LSE) excludes the reference determiner of the (LPE).

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<td>New Waves in Philosophy of Language</td>
<td>Sarah Sawyer</td>
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**New Waves in Philosophy**

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